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Abstract
The Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program (HVBP) is a Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) program implemented in 2012 to reward acute-care hospitals with
incentive payments for the quality of care provided to Medicare patients in inpatient settings.
Under this policy, payment adjustments are made based on a variety of factors including clinical
quality, patient experience, and cost reductions. This paper uses state-level variation in the
implementation of HVBP to ascertain whether the policy led to improvements in Healthy Days
(a CDC-designed composite measure of individuals’ self-reported number of physically and
mentally “healthy” days per month), health disparities, and community benefit spending patterns
using a difference-in-differences model. Notably, this paper adds to economic literature on health
equity by utilizing and comparing three measures of health disparity, including a novel measure
of health inequity that includes a social justice component in the U.S. context. Results show that
the HVBP led to meaningful improvements in Healthy Days, with differential effects based on
income and race. It also significantly reduced health disparities and significantly increased
certain types of community benefit spending, showing that hospitals can and should be invested
in addressing community health. Policymakers should continue to use value-based policies to
implement incentives to achieve health equity, but must be more thoughtful and intentional with
these efforts by grappling with racial, political, sociological, and economic structures that
contribute to inequity.
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Introduction
In response to high and rising healthcare costs in the United States (Levit et al., 2004),
healthcare reforms over the past two decades have attempted to reduce healthcare costs while
maintaining, if not improving, quality of care. Compared to other high-income countries, the
United States has the highest uninsured rate and also spends more per capita on healthcare
(Papanicolas et al., 2018). This spending does not translate to better outcomes; compared to other
OECD nations, the U.S. spends nearly twice as much on healthcare as a share of the economy as
the average OECD country but has the lowest life expectancy, the highest suicide rate, the
highest chronic disease burden, and one of the highest rates of hospitalizations from preventable
causes (Tikkanen & Abrams, 2020). Income-based health disparities are much more pronounced
in the United States than in other high-income countries (Choi et al., 2020). A large body of
literature suggests that health disparities, including disparities by race, gender, and
socioeconomic status, to name a few, are not only morally unjust but have a significant financial
cost (Waidmann, 2009; LaVeist et al., 2011; Turner, 2016; Thorpe et al., 2013). By some
estimates, eliminating health disparities for racial/ethnic minorities would have reduced direct
medical care expenditures by about $230 billion and indirect costs associated with illness and
premature deaths by more than $1 trillion for the years 2003 – 2006 (in 2008 inflation-adjusted
dollars) (LaVeist et al., 2011). Others estimate that disparities in health in the U.S. today
represent $93 billion in excess medical care costs and $42 billion in untapped productivity, for a
total potential economic gain of $135 billion per year (Turner, 2016). Therefore, a clear
monetary incentive to reduce inequity in health outcomes across socioeconomic and
demographic lines exists from both social justice and economic perspectives.
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While structural causes of health inequity such as disparities in food access, health
insurance coverage, and racial disparities in wealth are well-documented, relatively little is
known about the impact that hospitals can have in furthering equity. Value-based payment
includes models that attach financial incentives/disincentives with provider performance in a
variety of domains including clinical quality, readmission rates, patient experience, and costeffectiveness of care. One such value-based program currently in place in the United States is the
Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program
(HVBP), which reduces all Medicare payments to acute-care hospital by 2% and redistributes the
saved funds to hospitals based on their performance and year-to-year improvement in four
domains: safety, clinical care, efficiency and cost reduction, and patient and caregiver-centered
experience (NEJM Catalyst, 2018). How hospital-level incentives introduced by HVBP in 2012
affect health outcomes, health inequity, and community health-related spending by hospitals
(formally known as community benefit spending), is explored further in this paper.
Theoretically, hospitals that seek to improve their patient engagement scores and reduce
costs may choose to invest in community health spending to reach underserved populations who
typically have limited access to low-cost care such as primary care and are over-utilizers of highcost care such as emergency departments, both due to greater accessibility and poorer health
(Kangovi et al., 2013). Examples of community benefit spending include community building
activities (e.g. establishing a hospital-based food bank or housing voucher program), providing
more free care or accepting more Medicaid patients even though Medicaid typically has lower
reimbursement rates than private insurers, or conducting research on the health needs of the local
community. Unfortunately, the literature regarding community benefit spending is comparatively
sparse. One longitudinal study found that in spite of the ACA’s requirement for hospitals to
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conduct and report Community Health Needs Assessments to guide their benefit spending,
community benefit spending increased only marginally after the passage of the ACA (Young et
al., 2018). Others found that hospitals located in states where Medicaid expansion took effect
decreased spending in uncompensated care but that these savings did not translate into additional
direct community benefit spending (Kanter et al., 2020). The nature of the relationship between
the average amount spent on providing direct community benefits by hospitals and health equity
rates in the hospital’s service area is unknown; whether hospitals with historically high
community benefit spending have indeed improved health equity in the areas surrounding them
leading to a positive correlation between the two, or whether hospitals in areas of low equity are
spending more on community benefits to ameliorate the disparities, leading to a negative
correlation, is unclear but necessary to avoid unintentional penalties. Thus, while promoting
health equity is not an explicitly stated goal of the HVBP program, the value-based incentive
structure which prioritizes the patient care experience, clinical quality, and cost-reduction may
reduce the health gap between the most and least privileged patients. The central research
question then, is to understand whether healthcare payment reforms that reward quality of care
rather than quantity of care (as the shift away from fee-for-service and toward value-based
payment continues to do) effectively lead to changes in hospital behaviors that ultimately
improve average health and reduce gaps in health outcomes for local residents.
Using state-level variation in the implementation of HVBP, this paper analyzes the role
of value-based policies and their potential to improve aggregate health outcomes, reduce health
disparities, and promote community health initiatives at hospitals nationwide. A difference-indifferences (DID) analysis is used to assess hospitals’ potential to improve equity through two
channels: improved patient communication and community investments. Data sources include
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the CDC’s BRFSS from the 2010 to 2016 periods to quantify health outcomes using Healthy
Days and health disparities using three different measures, as well as data from the Hospital
Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) to evaluate patient
experience ratings, and data compiled by RTI International to quantify hospitals’ community
benefit spending. Supplementary multiple linear regression models are utilized to identify the
associations between hospital quality (using HCAHPS data on patient communication) and
benefit spending, and health outcomes and equity. In other words, this paper evaluates whether
value-based policies that do not explicitly aim to reduce inequity maintain the status-quo,
exacerbate inequities, or reduce them by motivating hospital spending patterns toward
community-oriented efforts.
Much of the existing health economics research has studied the effects of various policies
on access to care, primarily through changes in insurance coverage and healthcare utilization, but
little attention has been given to how healthcare policies have impacted health equity. The
concept of “health equity” is not new, but it has been difficult for researchers to standardize for
evaluation purposes, contributing to the issue. In a widely cited paper, Whitehead (1992) defined
health inequities as “differences in health that are unnecessary, avoidable, unfair and unjust.”
Braveman and Gruskin (2003) built on this definition, supporting “operationalization of the right
to the highest attainable standard of health as indicated by the health status of the most socially
advantaged group” and specifically noted the importance of comparing both health outcomes and
the social drivers of health between more and less advantaged social groups. In doing so,
Braveman and Gruskin contextualize inequitable patterns in health outcomes between various
demographic groups by grounding the study of health in the study of the socioeconomic and
political factors that lead to these disparities. Previous literature has used various indicators and
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composite measures to quantify structural and community drivers of health outcomes, including
community trauma, Gini Index, and academic achievement (Davis, 2015). More recently,
UCLA’s Center for Health Advancement developed a “Health Equity Metric” (HEM) that is
distinct from other traditionally used measures, and builds on Braveman and Gruskin’s
sociologically-grounded framework. While other measures of inequity usually compare an
individual’s health to the population average, HEM compares an individual’s health with the
average health of the most socially privileged group. Using data regarding respondents’ average
number of healthy days per month, researchers have calculated “the distastefulness associated
with one's health falling short of optimal achievable health, instrumentalized as the median
health of the most socially privileged category, that of upper-income white men.” Because of its
novelty, few studies have been able to study health equity through this lens, but existing
literature has shown that the Health Equity Metric has actually declined over time, underscoring
a lack of progress in this domain in spite of major changes in health policy at the federal level
(Zimmerman and Anderson, 2019). Thus, the literature in this space is graduating from the
identification of health disparities toward the measurement of health inequities, and should
continue to prioritize the evaluation of various policies and programs that promote health equity.
This thesis evaluates how HVBP led to changes in health inequities using the HEM along with
two other measures to see whether different measures of disparities tell different stories about
health inequity in America.
The HVBP’s novel addition of patient experience-based financial rewards for hospitals
poses an interesting question as to whether positive patient experience actually translate to better
health outcomes. The policy uses the nationally administered Hospital Consumer Assessment of
Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) survey to determine payment rates, providing
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better reimbursement rates to hospitals that score better for patient communication and overall
patient care ratings. Beginning in FY 2018, this “Person and Community Engagement” portion
accounted for 25% of the overall score, and was used to determine payments.1 The theoretical
model developed by Street et al. (2009) links clear and culturally aware doctor-patient
communication to better patient health outcomes due to better information exchange, and
through fostering trust and feelings of patients’ self-determination.
Previous research has confirmed communication biases towards patients of color, so
policies that encourage better patient communication may actually benefit patients of color more
than white patients, thus contributing to lessened health disparities. For example, Johnson et al.
(2004) found that physicians were more verbally dominant and less engaged in patient-centered
communication with Black patients when compared to white patients, contributing to racial
disparities in health care quality. This difference is consistent with other findings that Black
Americans tend to receive care at hospitals with lower quality scores compared to white
Americans (Figueroa et al., 2016). Studies have also found that lower hospital quality scores tend
to cluster in densely population and demographically heterogeneous areas (McFarland et al.,
2015). While some argue that tying hospital quality to Medicare reimbursement through HVBP
would incentivize hospitals to proactively and intentionally improve the patient experience
through various efforts, others fear that doing so would unintentionally penalize hospitals serving
more diverse and at-risk patient populations. While it is not the focus of this paper to
characterize the distribution of patient experience scores across hospitals, some analyses will
explore the associations between hospital quality scores for communication and patient

1

https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-NetworkMLN/MLNProducts/downloads/Hospital_VBPurchasing_Fact_Sheet_ICN907664.pdf
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experience, hospital-level community benefit spending, and patient outcomes in terms of healthy
days and health inequities.
Little quantitative literature currently exists to understand how measures taken at the
hospital level can broadly affect health equity. Existing literature has largely focused on
intervention evaluations, and has extensively documented how particular programs have affected
disparities in hospital utilization and specific clinical outcomes. For example, deployment of
community health workers was shown to significantly decrease hospitalization due to asthma
amongst Black and Hispanic children who make up a disproportionate fraction of asthma
hospitalizations (Woods et al., 2016), and a number of studies provide evidence-based
programming to empower glycemic control amongst traditionally marginalized diabetic patients
(Golden et al., 2017). However, few studies have looked at how hospitals can introduce broadly
applicable initiatives to promote health equity. This paper addressing this gap in the literature to
determine whether payment structures incentivizing care quality not only lead to better health for
the overall population, but whether they also can be used as policy tools to ameliorate health
disparities.
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Literature Review
I.

Background
One of the most notable equity-related healthcare reforms was The Patient Protection and

Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010, often referred to as “Obamacare”. A central component of
the ACA was the expansion of Medicaid, the federal health insurance program primarily for lowincome individuals that is jointly funded by state and federal governments and administered
through state Medicaid programs. The ACA allowed states to expand their Medicaid program to
cover all adults with incomes up to 138% of the federal poverty line ($26,500 for a family of 4 in
20212) beginning in 2014. In spite of substantial federal subsidies to pay for expansion, not all
states in the U.S. adopted the expansion, causing significant variation in coverage across states.
As of August 2020, 38 states and the District of Columbia have adopted the Medicaid expansion,
while 12 have not. Of the 38 states that have adopted the Medicaid expansion, three of them
(Nebraska, Missouri, and Oklahoma) have not yet implemented it. Still, due to the ACA, the
number of uninsured nonelderly Americans decreased from over 46.5 million in 2010, to 27.5
million in 2018, making the ACA a key piece of legislation affecting health access and equity
(Tolbert et al., 2019).
Following the Affordable Care Act, a number of other healthcare reforms were
implemented, marking a shift away from fee-for-service (FFS) payments and towards “valuebased” payment (VBP) models. Whereas FFS models reimburse hospitals and healthcare
practitioners for each test ordered and each service provide, VBP models reimburse hospitals and
providers for quality and lowered costs of care (“CMS’ Value-Based Programs”). In essence,

2

See 2021 Poverty Guidelines from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: https://aspe.hhs.gov/2021poverty-guidelines

Kadiyala 14
newer payment models continue to incentivize improved quality of care rather than greater
quantity of care. Current value-based programs target improved quality and cost reduction across
various domains, some are broadly focused on hospital quality while others aimed to reduce
specific events such as readmissions or hospital-acquired infections, and still others incentivize
an increase in usage of skilled nursing facilities and home health models.
One example of a broad value-based program is Medicare’s Hospital Value Based
Purchasing (HVBP) program, which adjusts Medicare payments to hospitals based on their
performance on various domains that reflect hospital quality, including patient safety, patient
experience, efficiency, cost-reduction, complication, and hospital-associated infections. When
hospitals fail to meet certain quality point thresholds, a certain percentage of the total payment
that the hospital should receive from Medicare is deducted. Hospitals are rewarded for meeting
certain absolute thresholds and for improvements from year to year. While adjustments to the
quality scoring criteria are made annually, one major component of the score is “Patient and
Community Engagement,” which uses CMS’ Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare
Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) survey to assess improvements in areas such as doctor-patient
communication, cultural competency, community reputation, and overall patient satisfaction.
While HCAHPS was not intentionally developed to assess health equity, it does address some
key barriers to health equity as cited in literature, particularly communication.
In addition to Medicaid and Medicare-related health equity reform, various tax-related
policies have also sought to improve health equity by requiring certain hospitals to invest in the
communities they serve. Under Internal Revenue Service regulations, all 501(c)(3) nonprofit
hospitals, which account for approximately 56% of all hospitals in the U.S. (“Hospitals by
Ownership Type”) are also required to document their “community benefit” activities in
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exchange for their tax-exempt status. These include absorbing the cost of care for patients who
are uninsured or whose insurance plan pays less than the cost of care (common amongst patients
with Medicaid), creation of programs to support social determinants of health, workforce
development efforts, and advocacy funding, amongst many others. The ACA added to this,
requiring all 501(c)(3) tax-exempt hospitals to also conduct a Community Health Needs
Assessment (CHNA) every three years to better understand the needs of the communities they
serve. They are also required to create and adopt an Implementation Strategy that discusses how
the hospital plans to address concerns raised through the CHNA.
The landscape of healthcare policy is changing rapidly to create programs and policies
that incentivize better quality of care while also reducing healthcare costs. Through payment
reform and tax policy, hospitals are having to change their processes of care to avoid financial
penalties. Still, while the majority of policy is focused on improving aggregate health outcomes
and reducing aggregate healthcare costs, little attention is paid to reducing health inequities
specifically.

II.

Factors contributing to unequal health outcomes
Public health researchers have studied the “social determinants of health” for decades,

underscoring the role that structural factors – including access to healthy food, safe housing, a
clean environment, and transportation access, to name a few – have on healthcare utilization and
health outcomes (Kushel et al., 2006; Krieger and Higgins, 2002; Arcury et al., 2005, Nardone et
al., 2020). In essence, differential access to “upstream” or structural, non-medical commodities
such as food and clean air, causes “downstream” disparities in mental and physical health
outcomes. This paper will not go into further detail about these upstream factors because their
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effect is already well-known; rather, this paper will focus of hospital-level efforts that may
ameliorate the negative impacts of social risk factors contributing to inequity.
At the interpersonal level, a significant body of literature elucidates the role of unequal
doctor-patient interactions that perpetuate health inequity. Sun et al.'s (2000) study found that
Black patients had significantly lower patient satisfaction scores, and that a large reason for this
dissatisfaction stemmed from poor communication. Notably, they cite poor explanation of key
causes of the ailment, setting inaccurate expectations regarding wait times, not being told when
to resume normal activities or return for a follow-up appointment, as being highly correlated
with low overall patient satisfaction scores. Observing doctor-patient interactions to build on
these findings Johnson et al. (2004) found that physicians were 23% more verbally dominant and
33% less engaged in patient-centered communication with African American patients than with
White patients. Similarly, Carrasquillo et al. (1999) conducted surveys 10 days after patients had
an emergency room visit and found that non-English speakers were significantly more likely to
report overall problems with care, communication, and testing, significantly less likely to be
satisfied, and significantly less willing to return to the same emergency room. Given these
barriers to communication, the quality of doctor-patient communication may suffer resulting in
poorer treatment and worse health outcomes generally. One exception to this may be that Black
individuals had lower deaths due to prescription opioids during the opioid crisis in the United
States, but this was once again due to evidence of providers being less likely to recognize and
address pain amongst Black patients, a marker of poor patient care (Alexander et al., 2018).
Balsa and McGuire (2003) outline three potential mechanisms through which doctor-patient
relationships may produce racially discriminatory patterns of health: 1. bias (or prejudice)
against minorities, 2. greater clinical uncertainty when interacting with minority patients (e.g. not
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knowing how to interpret their presentation of symptoms), and 3. beliefs (or stereotypes) held by
the provider about the behavior or health of minorities.
Studies document that physicians do indeed exhibit different treatment patterns based on
the patient’s gender and race. In a landmark paper, Schulman et al. (1999) found that female
patients and Black patients were 40% less likely than male patients and White patients,
respectively, to be recommended for cardiac catherization when they presented with the same
symptoms of chest pain. Conversely, the physician’s gender has also been shown to cause
problematic differential treatment patterns based in race and gender stereotypes rather than
clinical necessity; male physicians have been shown to prescribe significantly higher doses of
narcotics to White and male patients, while female physicians have been shown to prescribe
significantly higher doses of narcotics to Black and female patients (Weisse et al., 2001). While
the exact reasons why these gendered and racialized differences exist is difficult to pinpoint,
studies have shown that patient’s race and socioeconomic status are associated with the
physicians' assessment of patient’s intelligence, feelings of affiliation toward the patient, and
beliefs about the patient's likelihood of risky behavior and adherence with medical advice (van
Ryn and Burke, 2000).
A few studies have tried to better understand the associations between patient satisfaction
and health outcomes, but they all use varying definitions of patient satisfaction and have mixed
results. Using HCAHPS data, some find that larger hospital size, high surgical volume, and low
mortality are positively associated with patient satisfaction (Kennedy et al., 2014), others find
that higher patient satisfaction is associated with less emergency department use but with greater
inpatient use, and higher overall health care and prescription drug expenditures (Fenton et al.,
2012). However, Kennedy and Fenton’s papers do not disaggregate by race and gender, and do
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not look at health inequity. More recently, researchers using MEPS (Medical Expenditures Panel
Survey) data found that patients who were younger, male, Black, on Medicaid, and patients with
lower socioeconomic status were more likely to report poor satisfaction, and while physical
health was not associated with patient satisfaction, patients with poor mental health and those
who had at least two emergency department visits per year were significantly more likely to have
poor overall satisfaction (Chen et al., 2019). This paper was able to show that some demographic
groups do indeed report lower satisfaction on standardized surveys, corroborating earlier
aforementioned research on racial disparities in doctor-patient communication, but does not link
patient satisfaction with health equity measures; rather it looks at individual-level health.
Research is therefore needed to understand whether better patient satisfaction on average is also
associated with greater health equity. This paper quantifies associations between metro area-level
hospital quality averages and health inequity, broadening the literature from person-level
associations to population-level associations.
Patterns of community benefit spending by hospitals is an area of research that is
relatively understudied in spite of its potentially large impact on population health and health
equity. Community benefit spending is typically aimed at providing healthcare for medically
underserved community members, whether through pro-bono care or through innovative
programming that addresses social determinants of health. The Affordable Care Act gained the
support of many hospitals because the expansion of Medicaid coverage would save hospitals
considerable money that would otherwise go uncompensated care. Retrospective studies found
uncompensated care costs decreased from 4.1 percentage points to 3.1 percentage points of total
operating costs in states that did expand Medicaid, and that the cost of uncompensated care could
have decreased by nearly 2% of total operating costs in non-expansion states, had they chosen to
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expand Medicaid (Dranove et al., 2016). While one would expect that these savings from
uncompensated care would be redirected toward more community health improvement
programs, studies showed that in the years immediately after the ACA went into effect,
community benefit spending increased only marginally (Young et al., 2018). Furthermore, not
only did total community benefit spending barely increase, but direct community investments, a
subsection of total community benefit spending, also barely changed in spite of the ACA’s
requirement of conducting a Community Health Needs Assessment (CHNA) to guide direct
community health spending (Chaiyachati et al., 2018; Kanter et al., 2020). This shows that
hospitals’ direct community spending is not yet aligned with the social needs of the communities
they serve, and hospitals investments in their communities are lagging in spite of their potential
to improve population health and reduce healthcare costs. Little literature exists to elucidate the
connection between the average amount spent by hospitals in any given region on providing
direct community benefits and health equity in those hospitals’ service areas. For one, the
directionality of the relationship is also unknown; it is unclear whether communities where
hospitals that have spent more on direct community benefits have higher health equity scores, or
whether high direct community benefit spending is indicative of and in response to low health
equity in surrounding communities. This paper uses multiple linear regressions to establish
associations between metropolitan area-level per capita community benefit spending and average
health outcomes and health equity.
In summary, while literature has shown race and gender-based disparities exist in doctorpatient communication, patient satisfaction scores, and treatment and prescription patterns, there
is a lack of research that connects whether incentivizing patient communication improves health
outcomes or health equity in particular. Furthermore, little research has been done to understand
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the role of community benefit spending as a potential lever to foster community-level health
equity. Given that Medicare’s Hospital Value Based Purchasing program incentivizes patient
satisfaction, clinical quality, and cost reduction, the policy could have spurred hospitals to
improve their outreach to medically underserved populations and groups that have
disproportionately poor health outcomes, although the extent of the policy’s impact on health
equity is largely unknown. Connecting these ideas, this paper will use multiple linear regressions
to understand whether greater hospital patient communication scores and/or community benefit
spending are associated with better average health outcomes and reduced disparities. It also
utilizes a difference-in-differences model to evaluate the Hospital Value Based Purchasing
program’s impact on health outcomes, health equity, and benefit spending patterns, to inform
whether value-based policies in health care are effective in guiding hospitals’ financial decisionmaking and performance regarding health inequity.

Data and Model
The health of an individual is contingent on social, political, and economic drivers that
exist from the interpersonal level to the national level. The persistence of health inequity is, in
many cases, not only a result of interpersonal discrimination, but structural racism, sexism, and
classism that perpetuate inequity. This thesis investigates whether using policy levers
incentivizing better communication with patients, as implemented with Medicare’s Hospital
Value-Based Purchasing Program improves aggregate health outcomes, promotes health equity,
and increases hospital-level community benefit spending. In theory, financial incentives to
promote patient communication might not only improve health outcomes for the whole
population, but may have a differential, more positive effect on health outcomes for marginalized
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groups who have experienced disproportionately poor communication, thus improving health
equity in addition to average population health outcomes. Furthermore, hospitals that seek to
improve their scores for patient communication may attempt a wide range of initiatives to
improve patient satisfaction, including increasing their community benefits spending in ways that
their patient population would directly experience.
This study takes advantage of state-level variation in the application of HVBP policy to
conduct a quasi-experimental policy analysis. The state of Maryland is the only state that was
exempt from the HVBP program, providing an opportunity to compare various outcomes of
interest between Maryland and other states in the pre-HVBP and post-HVBP periods. Maryland
operates the nation’s only all-payer hospital rate regulation system which has been in place since
1977. Under this system, all insurers in Maryland reimburse hospitals at the same rate, differing
from other states in which commercial insurers typically reimburse hospitals at a much higher
rate than Medicaid and Medicare. In July 2009, Maryland implemented a Quality-Based
Reimbursement (QBR) program that uses very similar rate-setting measures to the federal
Medicare HVBP program that was established a few years later in October 2012. Because of
Maryland’s long-standing Medicare waiver for its all-payer rate-setting system and the
implementation of the QBR program, CMS has granted Maryland an exemption from
participation in HVBP.
The crux of this paper relies on this state-level variation to conduct three key differencein-differences models to understand whether the HVBP policy led to meaningful changes in
health outcomes, health equity, and community benefit spending. For the purposes of this paper,
the pre-treatment, or baseline period is 2010 – 2011 and the treatment period is 2013 – 2016. The
year 2012 is eliminated from all analyses because HVBP was implemented in the latter half of
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the year, contaminating results. Because Maryland implemented a similar statewide policy a
couple of years prior to HVBP, it is hypothesized that during the baseline period individuals
living in Maryland will have experienced better average health outcomes and less health
inequity, and also that hospitals in Maryland will have spent more on community benefit
spending per capita than those in other states. Therefore, over the course of the treatment period,
the difference in key variables of interest between Maryland, used as the control group, and the
states in the treatment group is estimated to shrink.
The states selected as treatment states for the purposes of these difference-in-differences
regressions are Louisiana, Georgia, Virginia, Delaware, North Carolina and New Jersey. These
states were chosen as a match for Maryland based on state-level demographic data. The
treatment states were the closest matches to Maryland based on per capita income, per capita
GDP, percent white, percent Hispanic, and percent Black. Percent female and average life
expectancy were comparable for all of the states. Table 1.1 shows key summary statistics for
individuals in the treatment and control groups during the first year of the pre-treatment period
(2010).3 It is important to note that Maryland had implemented a Medicaid eligibility expansion
under the Affordable Care Act in January 2014, but this was not the case for all of the states
chosen for the treatment group. Table 1.2 shows the timeline of Medicaid expansion for all of the
states in the treatment and control groups.
Table 1.1 State-level descriptive statistics (2010)

Average Population a
Average Per Capita GDP a
Average Annual Income a
Percent White b
3

Control
(n= 9,185)
5785982
56531.23
50007
61.12

Treatment
(n= 47,035)
6924063.83
54140.50
40932
68.96

In this table, the number of individuals (n) shown for control and treatment refers to the number of individuals in
the CDC BRFSS dataset which is used in regression analysis. The data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis is
largely used for state-by-state comparisons to determine treatment and control groups.
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Percent Black b
Percent Hispanic b
Median Age b
Percent Female b
Percent Non-HS Graduates b

30.89
8.19
38
51.6
6.89

24.20
9.22
37.32
51.19
10.2

Sources: a Bureau of Economic Analysis, Quarterly GDP and Personal Income by
State (2010); b CDC Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey (2010)
Table 1.2 Status of Medicaid Expansion, Treatment vs. Control States
Cohort
State
Date Medicaid Expansion Implemented
Control
MD
Jan. 2014
NJ
Jan. 2014
DE
Jan. 2014
LA
Jul. 2016
Treatment
VA
Jan. 2019
GA
Not Yet Expanded
NC
Not Yet Expanded
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) Status of State Medicaid Expansion
Decisions Interactive Map. https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/status-ofstate-medicaid-expansion-decisions-interactive-map/
Equation 1 shows the difference-in-differences regression that was conducted to
understand whether there was a significantly different change in individuals’ average healthy
days in states exposed to HVBP when compared to individuals in Maryland, which was exempt
from HVBP.4 The HVBP term is an indicator variable for individuals living in the
aforementioned treatment states. 𝑋!"# is a vector of individual characteristics including age,
gender, race, educational attainment, income, and insurance coverage. The term l# captures year
fixed effects and µ" indicates state fixed effects.
(1) ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠! = 𝐵$ + 𝐵% 𝐻𝑉𝐵𝑃 + 𝐵& 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝐵' 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑉𝐵𝑃 + 𝑋!"# + l# + µ"

4

All data analysis for this paper was conducted using STATA SE, Version 16.1.
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This paper adds to the existing literature on health disparities and health equity by comparing
three measures of “health disadvantage”. The term “health disadvantage” is used here as an
umbrella term encompassing measures of both disparity and inequity.
&

1. Weighted Absolute Disparity (WAD): 3𝑦!,) − 𝑦5* 6 , in which larger deviations from the
mean of the state’s average number of healthy days (both positive and negative) for a
given year are weighted more heavily. (Derived from Gakidou et al.'s (2000)
Individual/Mean Differences formula).
---$+!,# ,+

2. Weighted Relative Disparity (WRD): 7

--+%

&

8 , in which an individual’s weighted

difference from the average number of healthy days for the state in which they live is
relative to the state’s average number of healthy days for that year. In other words, a
larger absolute difference is more pertinent if the state’s healthy days average was low to
begin with. (Derived from Gakidou et al.'s (2000) Individual/Mean Differences formula).
&
---∗-,+
+
!,#
%
,
08
,
-+--∗-

3. Weighted Relative Inequity (WRI): 7

%

which is similar to measure 3, but the

comparison is made to the average number of healthy days of the most socially privileged
group in each state for that year. An a priori assumption is made that the most socially
advantaged group in every state is non-Hispanic White men in the highest income
category. (Derived from Zimmerman's (2019) Health Equity Metric). Furthermore, this is
solely a measure of health poorer than that of the average of the most socially privileged
group; all individuals with healthy days higher than the average of non-Hispanic White
men in the top income category receive a “0” for this score.
Regression 2 parallels regressions 1, but instead of healthy days as the dependent variable,
health disadvantage is the dependent variable.
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(2) ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒! = 𝐵$ + 𝐵% 𝐻𝑉𝐵𝑃 + 𝐵& 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝐵' 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑉𝐵𝑃 +𝑋!"# +

l# + µ"
Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics for the longitudinal data with disparity and inequity
measures calculated using state-level averages for each year. Notable differences are that the
control state has a higher percentage of college graduates, individuals in the highest income
group, and individuals who are employed. Maryland residents had significantly more healthy
days per month and significantly less WAD and WRI in both the pre-treatment and posttreatment periods.
Table 3.1 Individual Descriptive Statistics, Before and After HVBP
Pre-treatment
(2010-2011)

White (%)
College Graduate (%)
Income <$15,000 (%)
Income > $49,999 (%)
Has Health Insurance (%)
Employed a (%)
Healthy Days
Weighted Absolute
Disparity
Weighted Relative
Disparity
Weighted Relative Inequity

N (# of individuals)

Post-Treatment
(2013 - 2016)

Treatment
72.66
34.93
9.78
37.60
87.89
42.48
23.09
(10.84)

Control
71.85
41.63
5.38
48.48
92.33
49.98
23.99***
(10.10)

Treatment
67.74
37.36
8.50
39.86
89.34
43.03
23.26
(10.62)

Control
69.62
44.74
5.35
48.97
94.87
42.42
23.88***
(10.05)

117.29
(177.29)

102.029***
(180.06)

112.61
(176.20)

0.22
(0.33)
0.17
(0.36)

0.18
(0.31)
0.143***
(0.33)

106,236

19,302

Theoretical Theoretical
Min
Max

0.00

30.00

100.9157***
(176.60)

0.00

900

0.21
(0.33)
0.16
(0.35)

0.18
(0.31)
0.143***
(0.33)

0.00

1.00

0.00

1.00

253,772

87,785

Note: Refers to the percent of individuals earning wages and self-employed individuals.
Universe includes students, retirees, homemakers, those unable to work, and those out of work.
a
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The final difference-in-differences equation examines whether community benefit
spending changed significantly more in treatment states relative to Maryland. Community
benefit encompasses programs or activities that provide health-related services in response to
identified community needs. Community benefit programs have a special focus on the
disadvantaged populations and must be available to the broad community. According to the
IRS, to count as a community benefit, a program or activity must respond to a demonstrated
health-related community need and seek to achieve at least one community benefit objective:
increase access to health services, enhance public health, advance knowledgeable through
education or research, or relieve or reduce a burden of government to improve health. This
paper analyzes four subtypes of community benefit spending, namely community health
improvement services, community building activities, unreimbursed Medicaid and bad debt.
Community health improvement services are conducted with the explicit purpose of
improving health and do not generate revenue for the hospital. Community building activities
are those which take measures to improve health and safety and typically refers to efforts
tackling “upstream” social determinants of health such as education, environment, housing,
and food.5 Unreimbursed Medicaid refers to the difference between the total cost that the
hospital bears to provide care for Medicaid patient and the Medicaid payments received by
the hospital. Bad debt is the total cost of services for which a hospital anticipated payment
but did not receive it. Whereas unreimbursed Medicaid can be considered financial
assistance/charity care, bad debt is money that the hospital involuntarily loses due to
unrecovered costs. While bad debt is financially unfavorable for hospitals, it is possible that

5

Examples of community building activities include physical improvements like housing rehabilitation, economic
development through the creation of job training programs, educational investments such as mentoring programs,
environmental efforts to reduce air or water pollution, and more. See
http://www.communitybenefitinsight.org/?page=info.glossary#glossary_3 for more details.
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greater bad debt may actually translate to better health or fewer health disparities on average
because it would be indicative of individuals seeking medical care even when they cannot
afford to pay for it. Still, whether hospitals taking on more bad debt translates to better
patient outcomes is unknown, and the relationship may determine whether bad debt should
be incentivized at the policy level or whether internal management efforts at the hospital
level may be necessary to reduce bad debt.
To evaluate community benefit spending patterns, this paper uses hospital level data and
keeps the same pre- and post- period timeframes as above to see whether states in the
treatment group had significantly greater changes in community benefit spending. It was
hypothesized that states that experienced HVBP would invest more in their communities
through various forms of community benefit spending in order to increase their HCAHPS
patient ratings and to have better clinical outcomes. Table 3.2 shows hospital community
benefit spending trends of hospitals located in treatment and control states at 3-year intervals
from 2010 to 2016. In 2010, hospitals in treatment states spent an average of $36.2 million
on community benefits, and hospitals in Maryland (control) spent an average of $25.5
million. In both treatment and control states, total community benefit spending increased on
average. Also interestingly, healthcare access increased markedly in treatment states; the
percent of hospitals that were the sole community provider in a certain radius dropped from
8.011% to 0% in treatment states from 2010 to 2016. Table 3.3 in the Appendix contains the
same summary statistics but only compares the pre-period and the post-period, rather than
point-in-time figures for three years.
(3) 𝐶𝐵 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔! = 𝐵" + 𝐵# 𝐻𝑉𝐵𝑃 + 𝐵$ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝐵% 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑉𝐵𝑃 + 𝑋&'( + l( + µ'
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Regression 3 parallels the prior two regressions, but instead of analyzing person-level data,
it uses hospital-level data. Xist is a vector of hospital characteristics including whether or not the
hospital is a sole community provider, in an urban setting, a teaching hospital, in a state that
expanded Medicaid, or in a state that requires community benefit spending. The regression also
includes time (l# ) and state (µ" ) fixed effects.
Table 3.2 Hospital Benefit Spending Characteristics (Thousands of $), 2010 – 2016
2010
Total Community Benefits
Unreimbursed Medicaid
Community Health
Improvement
Community Building
Activities
Bad Debt
Sole Community Provider
(%)
Urban Hospital (%)
Teaching Hospital (%)
ACA Expansion State (%)
State Requires Community
Benefits (%)
N

2013
Treatment
Control

2016
Treatment

Control

Treatment

Control

36204.794
(79914.44)
8304.158
(12599.86)

25547.955
(79914.44)
222.470***
(776.19)

44024.205
(79914.44)
8157.438
(19495.43)

33659.556
(79914.44)
621.082***
(2791.01)

57540.630
(79914.44)
16613.751
(27824.56)

32443.737*
(79914.44)
746.104***
(1549.93)

1322.310
(2569.56)

2720.598***
(4406.43)

2374.530
(6576.24)

3113.184
(4663.45)

2020.695
(4386.60)

3996.174***
(6997.87)

146.559
(478.34)
10898.85
(13188.64)

735.526***
(1544.75)
11657.83*
(11860.89)

220.938
(530.21)
25463.42
(32873.85)

379.345*
(558.53)
15190.21**
(16667.74)

271.102
(1078.58)
33779.75
(47408.52)

582.331*
(846.99)
11169.44***
(10034.33)

8.01186944
74.7774481
34.7181009
33.2344214

0
93.4782609
39.1304348
100

7.58017493
74.9271137
35.8600583
33.5276968

0
93.75
37.5
100

0
76.2048193
36.1445783
33.7349398

0
93.75
37.5
100

85.1632047

100

84.2565598

100

83.7349398

100

337

46

343

48

332

48
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Results
Prior to running difference-in-difference regressions to evaluate the effect of HVBP, a
few preliminary regressions using Micropolitan/Metropolitan Statistical Area6 (MMSA)-level
data were conducted to characterize relationships between hospital performance for patient
experience, hospital community benefits, and health outcomes and inequities. All of these
regressions were multiple linear regressions conducted using 2016 numbers from HCAHPS,
BRFSS (specifically the MMSA-level SMART dataset), and community benefit datasets. These
regressions provided insight into the directionality of associations between these variables; it
enabled an understanding of whether better patient communication scores (measured using the
aforementioned HCAHPS survey) and more community benefit spending were indeed positively
associated with health outcomes (Healthy Days) and negatively associated with health disparities
(using the 3 aforementioned measures). Greater detail on these multiple linear regressions can be
found in the Appendix. To summarize, individuals living in MMSA’s where hospitals scored
better on HCAHPS had clinically negligible differences in healthy days compared to those that
scored worse. Additionally, there were mixed results as to whether greater MMSA HCAHPS
averages were correlated with less disparities as measured by WAD and WRD, and there was no
significant association between MMSA-level HCAHPS scores and WRI, suggesting that more
targeted efforts may be needed to reduce inequity, which is more rooted in social justice
frameworks than disparity is. Interestingly, greater community benefit spending was significantly
associated with more healthy days and less health disadvantage across all three measures suggest

6

The acronym “MMSA” refers to metropolitan statistical areas, micropolitan statistical areas, and metropolitan
divisions. These geographic subdivisions are designated by the U. S. Office of Management and Budget and used by
the U. S. Census Bureau as of June 2003. The general concept of a metropolitan or micropolitan statistical area is
that of a core area containing a substantial population nucleus, together with adjacent communities and all having a
high degree of economic and social integration. For addition information, see
https://www.cdc.gov/brfss/smart/smart_faq.htm
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that community benefit spending may potentially be a channel through which hospitals can
address health disparities and inequities.
These regressions illuminated the associations between various hospital patterns and
outcomes of interest but did not prove causality. The following sections discuss the results of the
difference-in-differences regressions which evaluate HVBP for its impact on healthy days, health
disadvantages, and community benefit spending.
I.

Effect on Healthy Days

Table 6.1 shows the results of the difference-in-differences regression with healthy days as
the outcome variable. Regression (1), without any demographic controls or state-level fixed
effects, shows a significant increase in healthy days by 0.115 days per month (p<0.01) as a result
of the policy. Adding demographic and socioeconomic controls in regression 2 shows an even
more pronounced intervention effect of 0.173 more healthy days per month (p<0.01) on average.
Adding state and year fixed effects in regression 3 slightly reduces the treatment effect, but it is
still significant (0.140; p<0.01). Further stratifying the regression by low-income and higherincome groups shows that the improvement in healthy days as a result of the policy was more
than twice as large for individuals in the lowest income groups (those earning less than $25,000
per year) as it was for individuals in the highest income group (those earning more than $50,000
per year) (Regressions 4 and 5, respectively). For low-income patients, those in treatment states
had 0.297 more healthy days on average than those in control states (p<0.01). In contrast,
patients in the highest income group saw an intervention effect Limiting the regression to only
White respondents and only non-White respondents showed that the treatment effect was
significant and positive, but only for White individuals. In fact, there was no significant change
in healthy days for non-White respondents at all. Limiting the regression even more to only
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Black individuals showed a decrease in Healthy Days by 0.195 Healthy Days per month (p<0.1).
Thus, while the HVBP may have been effective at reducing income-related disparities, it did not
seem to improve race-related disparities independent of income and may even have increased
race-based disparities given that the increase was driven largely by White individuals.

II.

Effect on Health Disadvantages

Next, the paper evaluated whether HVBP led to significant decreases in health disadvantages
using three different measures. In each case, adding demographic controls increased the
treatment effect but adding state and year fixed effects reduced the treatment effect (Table 6.2).
Across the board, the policy seemed to significantly decrease this disadvantage, whether it was
measures as weighted absolute disparity, weighted relative disparity, or weighted relative
inequity. In 2010, individual weighted absolute disparity ranged from 0 to 638.21, and the
treatment reduced weighted absolute disparity by an average of 3.58 points (p<0.01) after adding
controls and fixed effects. Similarly, weighted relative disparity (range 0,1) decreased by 0.007
points (p<0.01) and weighted relative inequity (range 0,1) decreased by 0.006 (p<0.01) as a
result of the treatment, after adding controls and state fixed effects.

III.

Effect on Community Benefit Spending

Previous MLR regressions established significant positive correlations with all forms of per
capita community benefit spending and Healthy Days within an MMSA, as well as significant
negative correlations between per capita benefit spending and health disparities and inequities
(Appendix). Given the evidence that community benefit spending improves health outcomes
and reduces disparities, it followed that HVBP, which would reward hospitals for improving
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patient outcomes, should theoretically also spur hospitals to spend more in community benefits.
Table 6.3 shows the impact of HVBP on hospital community benefit spending patterns using a
difference-in-differences model. However, the model showed no significant changes in total
community benefit spending, unreimbursed Medicaid spending, or community health
improvement services and community benefit operations spending. Interestingly, only
community building activities and bad debt spending changed (both increased) significantly as a
result of HVBP. Community building activities spending was $202,256 higher on average for
hospitals located in treatment states in the post-period after adding hospital and state-level
controls (p<0.05). This increased to $207,776 after adding both state and year fixed effects
(p<0.05). Average hospital bad debt was also significantly higher in treatment states than
control states in the post-intervention period. Hospitals in treatment states had an average of
$14.1 million more in bad debt (p<0.01) than those in control states after adding state and year
fixed effects. However, looking at the bad debt-to-revenue ratio shows no significant difference
between treatment and control states after program implementation. Thus, while hospitals in
treatment states had significantly greater average bad debt than those in control states in the
post-period, they also had proportionally greater revenue.

Discussion
This paper utilized difference-in-differences models to understand whether Medicare’s
Hospital Value Based Purchasing Program was effective in terms improving health outcomes,
reducing health inequities, or shifting hospital spending to prioritize community. The HVBP
program, which imposed payment incentives by withholding a certain percentage of Medicare
reimbursement to hospitals failing to improve in areas including clinical quality and patient
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experience, was particularly of interest because these incentives were specifically designed
improve health outcomes. However, whether these incentives also led to decreases in health
disparities and health inequity, and whether they encouraged hospitals to reallocate money
towards community health efforts to address “upstream” social determinants of health is largely
unknown. Using Maryland as the control state due to its exclusion from the HVBP program, the
model ascertained whether there was any significant divergence in these three areas between
treatment and control states in the post-intervention period (2012 – 2016), compared to the preintervention period (2010 – 2011).
The findings suggest that the program successfully increased average healthy days,
showing that financial incentives that align with value-based purchasing are indeed successful at
improving health at a high level. The Healthy Days measure is not as specific as a clinical
marker of health status, but it is also more specific than a long-term measure such as life
expectancy. The fact that it is derived from surveys through which individuals quantify their own
health status enables individuals to have agency over their representation in healthcare datasets.
It also allows for a more holistic view of health as “a state of complete physical, mental, and
social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity,” as defined by the World
Health Organization. The fact that HVBP not only led to aggregate improvements in Healthy
Days, but also had more beneficial effects for individuals in the lowest income groups is
encouraging for policymakers who are hoping to eliminate income-based disparities in health.
Still, the lack of significant improvements in Healthy Days for non-White individuals while
White individuals experienced significant improvements suggests that HVBP was not effective
at mitigating race-based disparities. In fact, further disaggregating “Non-White” showed that
Black individuals actually experienced a decrease in Healthy Days. Thus, while HVBP may have
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successfully improved aggregate Healthy Days and closed income-based inequities, it has been
ineffective at closing racial inequities, particularly the health gap between white and Black
individuals. This study supports previous findings by Zimmerman et al. (2019) showing a clear
lack of progress on health equity in the United States in the past two decades. Consequently,
there is an urgent need for value-based purchasing policies that explicitly incentivize hospitals,
payers, and health systems to decrease health inequities broadly, and specifically inequitable
outcomes driven by racial inequities.
The Economics literature remains relatively sparse in terms of offering standardized
quantitative measures of inequity that are rooted in Sociology and social justice-related
disciplines. Thus, this paper attempted to compare various statistical measures to see whether the
measure being used paints a different picture of how HVBP affected health disparities or health
inequities. Weighted Absolute Disparity and Weighted Relative Disparity are more “objective”
measures; in essence, they compare an individual’s health status to that of the average for the
individual’s state of residence for any given year. Using these measures, both absolute and
relative disparity showed significant decreases as a result of HVBP implementation, further
supporting previous results looking at changes in Healthy Days. Weighted Relative Inequity,
which calculates the difference between an individual’s Healthy Days and the average of the
most socially privileged group (White men in the highest income group) in any state and year,
also saw a decrease after the policy was implemented. While these statistically significant results
are encouraging, they lack economic significance in that the regression coefficients on
Post*Treat rounded to approximately 0.01 for both relative measures and only 3.58 for the
absolute measure (ranged from 0 to 638.21). This suggests that more targeted efforts to
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proactively and intentionally reduce health inequities are necessary to see economically
meaningful reductions in health disparities at the state-level.
To supplement this analysis, this paper sought to understand whether MMSA average
HCAHPS scores are correlated with Healthy Days, health disparities, and healthy inequity for
individuals living within those MMSA’s. In theory, if HCAHPS scores as they are currently used
are indeed correlated with these outcome variables, they may be a potential channel through
which Medicare could incentivize better HCAHPS performance, and thus improve health
outcomes and close health gaps. Unfortunately, the results were mixed; while some HCAHPS
measures showed positive correlations with Healthy Days, some showed negative correlations.
Furthermore, while HCAHPS scores were significantly negatively correlated with some
measures of health disparity (specifically Weighted, Absolute Disparity), other measures showed
no significant associations or some significant associations, but with varying directionality. This
is not to say that HCAHPS is a poor measure for Medicare to use to incentivize hospitals to
reduce health disparities. Rather, aggregating HCAHPS at the MMSA-level is likely too large of
an area to be able to draw any meaningful conclusions. Further research should be done to see if
hospitals’ HCAHPS scores are correlated with improved Healthy Days, health disparities, and
health inequities among the hospitals’ patient populations specifically, rather than the MMSA atlarge.
Along similar lines, a couple of MLR models were run to see if MMSA-level community
benefit spending patterns were associated with Healthy Days, health disparities, or health
inequity. By looking at whether MMSA’s average benefit spending was correlated health
outcomes or disparities, this analysis sought to elucidate whether policies incentivizing
community benefit spending could be beneficial to improving health outcomes and closing
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health gaps. Greater per capita benefit spending, both total and all sub-categories) were
significantly correlated with more Healthy Days and less disparity and inequity. This suggests
that policies incentivizing more community benefit spending may indeed be critical to improving
not only aggregate health outcomes, but to eliminating health gaps. Community building
activities were associated with the greatest “return” per dollar invested, with dramatic
improvements in Healthy Days and reductions in all three measures of health disadvantage. This
suggests that community benefit spending may indeed be a channel through which hospitals can
contribute to population health efforts seeking to improve aggregate health and reduce health
disparities. Given this, it is certainly encouraging that there was a significant increase in
community benefit spending dollars after HVBP was implemented, but an even greater
investment in community building activities may be even more beneficial. Specifically, investing
more in community building activities may be prudent for hospitals, especially as the shift
toward value-based care becomes more of a priority and hospitals experience a greater financial
incentive to improve population health.

Limitations
While this paper shows promising results, it also has significant limitations that must be
acknowledged in order to view these results in as objective a light as possible. As most natural
experiments in the healthcare space go, there are numerous confounding factors and co-occurring
policy changes that may have skewed results. First, Maryland is not a perfect control because it
is the only state with an all-payer hospital rate regulation system, which has been in place for
nearly 40 years. Under this system, both public and private insurers reimburse at the same rates,
and thus have the same degree of incentives to reduce unnecessary healthcare spending.
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Furthermore, this paper assumes parallel trends in the years before the documented pre-period
years (2010-2011) which may not necessarily be true. The implementation of Maryland’s own
Quality-Based Reimbursement (QBR) program in 2009 may have led to the state’s divergence
from the rest of the nation in the years that followed immediately, thus potentially violating this
trend. Figures 2a to 2d do indeed show slight divergences in trends for Healthy Days and the
three measures of health disparities starting in 2010. Thus, the difference-in-differences estimate
is imperfect and difficult to interpret on its own, but does still offer a glimpse of the extent to
which the outcomes of interest converge in the post-intervention years. Additionally, the
Affordable Care Act went into effect in 2010, and introduced a number of sweeping reforms
across the country. This included prohibiting denial of coverage of individuals based on preexisting conditions, allowing some states to expand Medicaid eligibility, and mandating nonprofit hospitals to conduct Community Health Needs Assessments (CHNA’s) and use the
information gathered to formulate a 3-year plan to address the identified community needs. For
the purposes of this study, it is assumed that the ACA affected both control and treatment states
in similar ways and to similar extents. Still, it is possible that the ACA actually had differential
effects on treatment and control states, so it would be prudent to interpret the treatment effect
estimates as the result of multiple policy changes, including the ACA and HVBP, and not
entirely the HVBP alone.
Future research in this area should use hospital data for more geographic precision to
evaluate the impact of community benefit spending on nearby areas. As healthcare providers and
communities prioritize health equity, a deeper understanding of community benefit spending and
its ability to serve as a tool to achieve equity will be necessary. Additional studies on publicprivate partnerships between health systems and local departments of public health and the ways
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in which both sectors can capitalize on their strengths to bolster community health are needed to
set best practices and evidence-based incentives. It will also be interesting to see the types of
clinical and equity impacts resulting from state community benefit spending and reporting
requirements.

Conclusion
Overall, better patient communication and more community benefit spending are shown
to be positively correlated with Healthy Days and negatively correlated with multiple measures
of health disparities. This suggests that lawmakers should consider incentivizing patient
communication and community benefit spending in order to improve population health,
especially amongst medically underserved communities and communities that have
disproportionately poor health outcomes. The paper also showed that value-based policies such
as the Hospital Value Based Purchasing Program led to greater benefit spending, more Healthy
Days, and smaller health gaps. Interestingly, the policy was successful in reducing income-based
health gaps far more than race-based health gaps, calling for more targeted policy solutions to
specifically mitigate racial health disparities in addition to broader programming to reduce
inequities generally. Additionally, while the three measures of health disparities did show similar
trends, the inequity measure that was based more in a social justice framework (WRI) generally
had weaker associations with patient communication scores and community benefit spending.
Thus, while shrinking disparities generally may be more attainable through improving patient
communication and increasing community benefit, adding nuance to the conversation by
addressing inequity, which requires grappling with racial, political, sociological, and economic
structures, will be a much larger challenge for healthcare policymakers.
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Still, this paper shows promising results; not only did HVBP lead to improvements in
health and health disparities, but it shows that hospitals can and should be invested in addressing
community health. Whether that involves racial bias in healthcare communication training for
providers or partnering with local non-profits to provide food and housing assistance for patients,
hospitals play a key part in solving the crisis of health inequity in the United States.
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Tables and Figures

Figure 1. Policy and Theoretical Model
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Table 3.3 Hospital Community Benefit Spending (Pre vs. Post-Treatment)
Pre-Treatment
(2010-2011)
Treatment
Control
Benefit Spending (millions $)
Total Community Benefits
Unreimbursed Medicaid
Comm. Health Improv.
Community Building Activities
Bad Debt
Other Hospital Characteristics
State ACA Expansion 138% FPL
(%)
State Requires CB Reporting (%)
Urban (%)
Sole Community Provider (%)
Teaching Hospital (%)
N

Post-Treatment
(2013 - 2016)
Treatment Control

37.50
(81.10)
8.15
(11.70)
1.46
(2.87)
0.17
(0.49)
14.70
(20.40)

27.40
(32.70)
0.18***
(19.50)
2.93***
(4.67)
.65***
(1.30)
12.20
(11.20)

55.80
(90.60)
14.30
(26.70)
2.06
(5.84)
0.21
(0.67)
31.80
(45.10)

33.90***
(42.50)
.52***
(2.05)
3.67***
(5.84)
0.53***
(0.79)
11.90***
(11.10)

33%
85%
75%
6%
35%

100%
100%
93%
0%
39%

35%
84%
77%
3%
37%

100%
100%
93%
0%
36%

674

92

1,823

255

Source: Community Benefit Insight Hospital Data API.
http://www.communitybenefitinsight.org/?page=info.data_api
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Note: Columns with state and year fixed effects (the complete model) are highlighted in grey for
ease.
Table 6.1 DND Effect of HVBP on Healthy Days
All

>$50,000

White

Non-White

Black

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(1)

(2)

0.17***

-0.14***

-0.02

-0.07***

-0.01

0.05

0.38***

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.05)

-0.142***
(0.03)

-0.25***
(0.0331)

-0.41***
(0.08)

-0.27***
(0.04)

-0.22***
(0.03)

0.32***
(0.06)

0.59***
(0.09)

0.12***

0.17***

0.14***

0.29***

0.14***

0.14***

0.06

-0.19*

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.10)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.08)

(0.12)

All Controls

N

Y

Y

State FE

N

N

Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Year FE

N

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Constant

23.23***

18.99***

18.99***

22.31***

25.58***

24.91***

25.13***

25.22***

(0.0114)

(0.0362)

(0.0380)

(0.0679)

(0.0498)

(0.0384)

(0.0606)

(0.110)

2,841,738
0.000

2,841,368
0.070

2,841,368
0.068

701,020
0.043

1,071,434
0.007

2,180,390
0.009

660,978
0.022

224,942
0.013

post
treat
Post x Treat

Observations
R-squared

(3)

<$25,000

Table 6.2 DND Effect of HVBP on Health Disparities

post
treat
post_treat
Constant

All Controls
State FE
Year FE

WAD
(1)

WAD
(2)

WAD
(3)

WRD
(1)

WRD
(2)

-2.27***
(0.232)
6.50***
(0.56)
-3.37***
(0.71)
110.8***
(0.18)
N
N
N

WRD
(3)

WRI
(1)

WRI
(2)

WRI
(3)

2.13***
(0.226)
8.30***
(0.552)
-4.11***
(0.69)
160.7***
(0.60)

-3.57***
(0.70)
161.2***
(0.63)

-0.01***
(0.000428)
0.01***
(0.00105)
-0.01***
(0.01)
0.208***
(0.00)

0.00**
(0.000418)
0.02***
(0.00102)
-0.01***
(0.01)
0.302***
(0.00)

-0.01***
(0.01)
0.301***
(0.00)

-0.004***
(0.00)
0.01***
(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.01)
0.163***
(0.00)

0.004***
(0.00)
0.01***
(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.01)
0.277***
(0.00)

-0.01***
(0.01)
0.278***
(0.00)

Y
N
N

Y
Y
Y

N
N
N

Y
N
N

Y
Y
Y

N
N
N

Y
N
N

Y
Y
Y
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Table 6.3 DND Effect of HVBP on Hospital Community Benefit Spending (millions of $)
Total
Community
Benefit
Spending

Unreimbursed
Medicaid

Comm. Health
Improvement

4.880

3.607

-0.147

(10.05)

(2.394)

(0.561)

Observations

2,299

2,299

R-squared

0.090

0.055

(Post x Treat), Fixed
Effect Model

Comm.
Building
Activities

Bad Debt

Bad
Debt/Total
Revenue

0.207**

14.051***

0.050

(0.091)

(4.136)

2,299

2,299

2,299

2,299

0.037

0.014

0.088

0.008

(0.063)
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Appendix
Additional Characterization Regressions
Data and Model
The first multiple linear regressions were conducted to illuminate associations between
health outcomes, health equity, and the quality of patient communication and community benefit
spending at various hospitals. Where noted, measures of hospital quality and hospital benefit
spending were aggregated to the Metropolitan/Micropolitan Statistical Area (MMSA) level, as
this is the most detailed geographic granularity offered by the CDC BRFSS SMART data used
for health outcomes and health equity measures. All of these multiple linear regressions are all
limited to the January – December 2016 timeframe.
The first key outcome of interest from HVBP is to assess the extent to which the policy
improved average health outcomes. This paper measures health outcomes using Healthy Days, a
CDC-approved composite measure of the number of days per month that an individual reported
feeling physically and mentally health7. Regression 1 is a preliminary characterization of various
factors that potentially affect individual’s healthy days. In addition to analyzing demographic
factors (race, sex), education level and socioeconomic factors (income, insurance status,
employment status), the regression also attempts to understand whether hospitals’ patient
communication scores are positively associated with healthy days. To do this, patient
communication scores from HCAHPS data are averaged at the MMSA-level. The four domains
of patient communication are: doctor-patient communication, nurse-patient communication,
communication at discharge, and overall patient satisfaction. Table 2.1 shows the average scores

7

For details on calculations of the Healthy Days measure, see the CDC’s guidelines here:
https://www.cdc.gov/hrqol/methods.htm
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for these various components of the Person and Community Engagement dimension of the
HVBP reimbursement methodology, which is calculated using HCAHPS scores. The table
displays data for the 3,278 that are located in the 136 MMSAs included in the BRFSS dataset
with MMSA-level geographic specificity (the Selected Metropolitan/Micropolitan Area Risk
Trends, or SMART dataset).
Table 2.1 HCAHPS Quality Scores
(FY 2018: Performance Period Jan. - Dec. 2016)
Doctor-Patient Communication
79.53988
(4.17)
Nurse-Patient Communication
78.90652
(4.32)
Discharge Communication
86.72552
(3.28)
Overall Hospital Rating
70.73441
(7.41)
N (# of Hospitals)
3,278
Source: Person and Community Engagement dimension scores (HCAHPS) from the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services. https://data.cms.gov/provider-data/dataset/avtz-f2ge
It is expected that individuals living in MMSA’s with better average scores in each of
these domains will experience better health, so the coefficient of this term is expected to be
positive. However, it is unclear which of the four domains being tested will be most strongly
predictive of individual health. Because MMSA’s often cross state boundaries, no state-level
fixed effects are included. 𝑋! is a vector of individual characteristics including race, sex,
educational attainment, income group and insurance status, and d. is a vector of MMSA-level
characteristics including per capita income and population.
(1) ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠& = 𝐵) + 𝐵# 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝐴 𝐻𝐶𝐴𝐻𝑃𝑆 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 𝑋& + d* + ℰ
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Regression 2 is almost identical to Regression 1, except that the dependent variable is
measure of health inequity. More correctly, the term “inequity” has a component of social
justice, so the equation below shows a justice-neutral term, “disadvantage”.
(2) ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒! = 𝐵$ + 𝐵% 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝐴 𝐻𝐶𝐴𝐻𝑃𝑆 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 𝑋! + d𝑚 + ℰ
In this second regression, it is hypothesized that individuals living in MMSA’s with
higher HCAHPS scores for communication and satisfaction will have better health outcomes
and less health inequity on average. Although it is expected that respondents living in
MMSA’s where the median income is greater are likely healthier, it is unclear whether
disparities will also be lower. When using an equity measure, however, respondents living in
MMSA’s where the median income is lower may experience greater inequity.
Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics of BRFSS SMART Respondents (2016)
White (%)
74.6
College Graduate (%)
40.52
Income <$15,000 (%)
7.1
Income > $49,999 (%)
43.33
Has Health Insurance (%)
92.62
Healthy Days
23.50187
(10.327)
Weighted Absolute Disparity
106.1125
(174.209)
Weighted Relative Disparity
0.194
(.317)
Weighted Relative Inequity
0.153
(.336)
MMSA Population
2476947
(2919973)
MMSA Per Capita Income
51600.74
(9452.081)
N (individuals)
N (MMSAs)

232,603
136
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This paper also analyzes hospital-level community benefit spending regressions were
conducted to understand associations between per-capita benefit spending, health outcomes, and
health equity.
Table 2.3 MMSA Average Per Capita Community Benefit Spending in 2016 (Thousands of
$)
Per Capita Total Community Benefits
0.139
(0.312)
Per Capita Unreimbursed Medicaid
0.061
(0.181)
Per Capita Community Health Improvement
0.004
(0.011)
Per Capita Community Building Activities
0.001
(0.002)
Per Capita Bad Debt
0.06
(0.126)
MMSA Population
2476947.3
(2919973)
N (individuals)
N (MMSAs)

177,829
136

Mirroring regression 1, regression 3 elucidates associations between per capita hospital
community benefit spending and healthy days. In other words, this regression seeks to unveil
whether individuals living in MMSA’s where hospitals have invested more per capita in
community benefit spending have greater healthy days on average. For this regression, the
timeframe is once again limited to the year 2016. 𝑋! is a vector of individual characteristics
including race, sex, educational attainment, income group and insurance status, and d. is a
vector of MMSA-level characteristics including per capita income and population.
(3) ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠! = 𝐵$ + 𝐵% 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝐴 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝 𝐶𝐵 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑋! + d. + ℰ
(4) ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒! = 𝐵$ + 𝐵% 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝐴 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝 𝐶𝐵 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑋! + d. + ℰ
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Similar to regression 2, regression 4 examine the effect of average MMSA per-capita
community benefit spending on health disadvantage, rather than healthy days.

Results
Individuals living in MMSA’s where hospitals performed better for nurse-patient
communication and communication at discharge in 2016 have statistically significantly fewer
healthy days per month, but the clinical significance is arguably negligible (Table 4.1). For
example, a one-point increase in nurse-patient communication and communication upon
discharge from the hospital correspond to a decrease of 0.02 healthy days per month (p<0.05;
p<0.1, respectively). While causality cannot be determined, this may possibly be indicative of
more challenging patient bases in certain areas that could have contributed to lower Healthy
Days scores. Interestingly, MMSA’s with better patient communication and overall hospital
ratings were mostly negatively correlated with both the absolute and relative measures of
disparity, suggesting that promoting patient communication may indeed be a channel through
with health disparities could be reduced (Table 4.2, Table 4.3). After adding controls, a one-point
increase in average communication with doctors was correlated with a 0.34 unit decrease in
weighted absolute disparity (p<0.05). Additionally, a one-point score increase in average
communication at discharge was correlated with a 0.38 unit decrease in weighted absolute
disparity (p<0.1). While HCAHPS scores were statistically significantly correlated with
weighted relative disparity, the directionality was inconsistent, and the regression coefficients
rounded to 0. Better nurse communication was once again associated with greater weighted
relative disparity (p<0.01), while better doctor communication, discharge communication, and
overall score, were associated with lower weighted relative disparity (p<0.05, p<0.1, p<0.01
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respectively). The one measure of inequity (weighted relative inequity) used in this study showed
no significant associations with any of the HCAHPS scores. This lack of significant associations
between MMSA-level HCAHPS scores and health inequity suggest that more targeted efforts
may be needed to reduce inequity, which is more rooted in social justice frameworks than
disparity is (Table 4.4).
Additionally, multiple linear regressions using 2016 data showed that individuals living
in MMSA’s with greater average per capita community benefit spending did indeed experience
more Healthy Days and smaller health gaps by all measures, suggesting that incentivizing
community benefit spending may be a policy level that can be used to both improve aggregate
health outcomes and reduce health disparities (Table 5.1). Total community benefit spending
encompasses a variety of expenditures, from unreimbursed Medicaid to community health
improvement activity. After adding controls, a $1,000 increase in per capita total community
benefit spending was associated with an average increase in 0.6 Healthy Days (p<0.01), an 11.7
point decrease in weighted absolute disparity (p<0.01), a 0.03 unit decrease in weighted relative
disparity (p<0.01), and 0.02 unit decrease weighted relative inequity (p<0.01). Unreimbursed
Medicaid, which is the amount that hospitals spend covering the cost of care that is not fully paid
by Medicaid reimbursements, also saw similar but more pronounced trends. With controls, a
$1,000 increase in per capita unreimbursed Medicaid spending in a particular MMSA was
associated with an addition of 1.1 Healthy Days, an 18.6 unit decrease in weighted absolute
disparity, a 0.05 unit decrease in weighted relative disparity, and a 0.04 unit decrease in weighted
relative inequity (all p<0.01) (Table 5.2). Community building activities, a subcategory of total
community benefit spending that refers specifically to activities that help address “upstream”
factors and social determinants that impact health such as education, air quality, and access to
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nutritious food had the greatest return on Healthy Days, and health disparity and inequity
reduction. Every $100 increase in per capita community building activities spending was
associated with a 4.3 day increase in Healthy Days, a 62.6 unit decrease in weighted absolute
disparity, a 0.16 unit decrease in weighted relative disparity, and a 0.13 unit decrease in health
inequity (p<0.01 for all four outcomes) (Table 5.3). Community Health Improvement spending
followed similar trends. A $1000 increase in per capita CHI spending was associated with 16.19
more healthy days, a 264 unit decrease in WAD, 0.71 unit decrease in WRD, ad 0.51 unit
decrease in WRI (all p<0.01) (Table 5.4). Finally, Bad Debt, which consists of services for which
a tax-exempt hospital anticipated payment from either an individual or an insurer but did not
receive, also saw similar trends. Every $1,000 increase in per capita bad debt was associated with
a 0.9 day increase in Healthy Days, a 23.6 unit decrease in weighted absolute disparity, a 0.07
unit decrease in weighted relative disparity, and a 0.04 unit decrease in weighted relative
inequity (p<0.01 for all) (Table 5.5). The significant positive associations healthy days and the
significant negative associations with all measures of health disparity suggest that community
benefit spending may potentially be a channel through which hospitals can address health
disparities. Consequently, later difference-in-differences models sought to understand whether
HVBP actually spurred hospitals to increase their community benefit spending or to change their
benefit spending patterns in order to improve health outcomes and close health gaps.
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Regression Tables
Table 4.1 MMSA-Average HCAHPS Achievement Scores and Healthy Days
Avg. Nurse
Communication Score

-0.06***
(0.01)

-0.024**
(0.00)

Avg. Doctor
Communication Score

-0.00
(0.01)

0.01
(0.01)

Avg. Discharge
Comm.

-0.03***
(0.01)

-0.02*
(0.01)

Avg. Overall Score
Constant

27.98***
(0.704)

19.55***
(0.799)

23.80***
(0.718)

17.11***
(0.769)

26.35***
(0.910)

19.57***
(1.084)

-0.01**
(0.01)
24.22***
(0.361)

All Controls
Observations
R-squared

N
232,603
0.000

Y
230,205
0.065

N
232,603
0.000

Y
230,205
0.065

N
232,603
0.000

Y
230,205
0.065

N
232,603
0.000

-0.00
(0.01)
17.67***
(0.444)
Y
230,205
0.065

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: race, sex, age group, income group, health
insurance status, MMSA per capita income, MMSA population
Table 4.2 MMSA-Average HCAHPS Achievement Scores and Weighted Absolute Disparity
(WAD)
Avg. Nurse
Communication
Score

0.94***
(0.15)

0.25
(0.17)

Avg. Doctor
Communication
Score

-0.14
(0.15)

-0.34**
(0.16)

Avg. Discharge
Comm. Score

0.10
(0.18)

-0.38*
(0.21)

Avg. Overall Score
Constant
All Controls
Observations
R-squared

32.67***
(11.88)
N
232,603
0.000

169.4***
(13.53)
Y
230,205
0.057

117.3***
(12.11)
N
232,603
0.000

216.4***
(13.02)
Y
230,205
0.057

97.09***
(15.36)
N
232,603
0.000

222.9***
(18.37)
Y
230,205
0.057

0.20**
(0.09)

-0.07
(0.09)

92.18***
(6.096)
N
232,603
0.000

195.3***
(7.520)
Y
230,205
0.057

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: race, sex, age group, income group, health
insurance status, MMSA per capita income, MMSA population
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Table 4.2 MMSA-Average HCAHPS Achievement Scores and Weighted Relative Disparity
(WRD)
Avg. Nurse Communication Score 0.00265*** 0.00103***
(0.000276) (0.000300)

Avg. Doctor Communication Score

4.86e-05 -0.000575**
(0.000279) (0.000290)

Avg. Discharge Comm. Score

0.000688** -0.000666*
(0.000322) (0.000378)

Avg. Overall Score

0.000532*** -0.000429***

Constant

(0.000157)

(0.000164)

-0.0142

0.300***

0.190***

0.428***

0.134***

0.441***

0.156***

0.415***

(0.0217)

(0.0246)

(0.0221)

(0.0237)

(0.0280)

(0.0334)

(0.0111)

(0.0137)

All Controls

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

Observations

232,603

230,205

232,603

230,205

232,603

230,205

232,603

230,205

0.000

0.061

0.000

0.061

0.000

0.061

0.000

0.061

R-squared

Table 4.3 MMSA-Average HCAHPS Achievement Scores and Weighted Relative Inequity
(WRI)
Avg. Nurse
Communication Score

0.00201***
(0.000292)

Avg. Doctor
Communication Score

0.000590*
(0.000318)
0.000147
(0.000296)

Avg. Discharge
Comm. Score

-0.000324
(0.000307)
0.000607*
(0.000342)

Avg. Overall Score
Constant
All Controls
Observations
R-squared

-0.00373
(0.0230)
N
232,603
0.000

0.142***
(0.0234)
Y
232,603
0.000

0.101***
(0.0297)
N
232,603
0.000

-0.000419
(0.000401)
0.000457***
(0.000166)
0.122***
(0.0118)
Y
232,603
0.000

0.282***
(0.0261)
N
230,205
0.061

0.355***
(0.0251)
Y
230,205
0.061

0.365***
(0.0354)

-7.38e-05
(0.000174)
0.334***
(0.0145)

N

Y

230,205
0.061

230,205
0.061
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Table 5.1 MMSA Average Per Capita Total Community Benefit Spending (Thousands of
$), health outcomes, and health disparities
Healthy
Healthy
Days
Days
WAD
WAD
WRD
WRD
WRI
Per Capita Total
Community Benefits
(Thousands of $)
0.48*** 0.62*** -9.15*** -11.7*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02***
(0.10)
(0.10)
(1.77)
(1.79)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.00)
Constant

WRI

-0.02***
(0.00)

23.37*** 16.40*** 108.8*** 209.9*** 0.201*** 0.443*** 0.159*** 0.368***
(0.03)
(0.24)
(0.48)
(4.05)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.01)
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307
0.000
0.068
0.000
0.059
0.000
0.064
0.000
0.064

All Controls
Observations
R-squared

Table 5.2 MMSA Average Per Capita Unreimbursed Medicaid (Thousands of $), health
outcomes, and health disparities

Per Capita
Unreimbursed
Medicaid
Constant
All Controls
Observations
R-squared

Healthy
Days

Healthy
Days

WAD

WAD

WRD

WRD

WRI

WRI

0.93***
(0.20)

1.14***
(0.201)

-15.41***
(3.39)

-18.60***
(3.38)

-0.037***
(0.01)

-0.047***
(0.01)

-0.03***
(0.01)

-0.04***
(0.01)

23.38*** 16.51***
(0.03)
(0.23)
N
Y
177,307 177,307
0.000
0.068

108.5***
(0.46)
N
177,307
0.000

207.6***
(4.02)
Y
177,307
0.059

0.200***
(0.00)
N
177,307
0.000

0.437***
(0.01)
Y
177,307
0.063

0.158***
(0.00)
N
177,307
0.000

0.364***
(0.01)
Y
177,307
0.064

Table 5.3 MMSA Average Per Capita Community Building Activities Spending
(Thousands of $), health outcomes, and health disparities
Healthy
Healthy
Days
Days
WAD
WAD
WRD
WRD
WRI
Per Capita
Community
Building Activities

Constant
All Controls
Observations

-0.456
(12.29)

43.94***
(12.02)

171.1
(205.9)

-626.5***
(202.4)

23.44***
(0.0256)
N
177,307

16.50***
(0.240)
Y
177,307

107.4***
(0.430)
N
177,307

207.6***
(4.035)
Y
177,307

0.317
(0.378)

-1.62***
(0.371)

0.311
(0.401)

WRI
-1.27***
(0.393)

0.198*** 0.437*** 0.157*** 0.364***
(0.000788) (0.00739) (0.000837) (0.00784)
N
Y
N
Y
177,307
177,307
177,307
177,307
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R-squared

0.000

0.068

0.000

0.059

0.000

0.063

0.000

0.064

Table 5.4 MMSA Average Per Capita Community Health Improvement Services
(Thousands of $), health outcomes, and health disparities
Healthy
Days
Per Capita CHI
Activities
Constant
All Controls
Observations
R-squared

Healthy
Days

WAD

WAD

10.38*** 16.19***
(3.956)
(3.929)

-173.1***
(66.30)

-264.0***
(66.16)

23.40*** 16.49***
(0.0292)
(0.240)
N
Y
177,307 177,307
0.000
0.068

108.2***
(0.489)
N
177,307
0.000

207.9***
(4.034)
Y
177,307
0.059

WRD
-0.42***
(0.122)

WRD
-0.71***
(0.121)

WRI
-0.31**
(0.129)

WRI
-0.51***
(0.128)

0.200*** 0.438*** 0.158*** 0.365***
(0.000898) (0.00738) (0.000953) (0.00783)
N
Y
N
Y
177,307
177,307
177,307
177,307
0.000
0.063
0.000
0.064

Table 5.5 MMSA Average Per Capita Bad Debt (Thousands of $), health outcomes, and
health disparities
Healthy
Healthy
Days
Days
WAD
WAD
WRD
WRD
WRI
WRI
Per Capita
Bad Debt
Constant
All Controls
Observations
R-squared

0.388*
(0.21)

0.990***
(0.22)

-11.37***
(3.62)

-23.59***
(3.79)

-0.02***
(0.01)

-0.07***
(0.01)

-0.02**
(0.01)

-0.04***
(0.01)

23.41***
(0.02)
N
177,307
0.000

16.28***
(0.24)
Y
177,307
0.068

108.2***
(0.46)
N
177,307
0.000

213.8***
(4.19)
Y
177,307
0.059

0.19***
(0.00)
N
177,307
0.000

0.45***
(0.01)
Y
177,307
0.064

0.16***
(0.00)
N
177,307
0.000

0.37***
(0.01)
Y
177,307
0.064
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